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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In 2009, Irwin "Ryan" Adams was involved in a single-car crash. Tragically, his 
passenger, his best friend, died as a result of injuries sustained in that crash. Based on 
these facts, the State chose to charge Ryan was the crime of vehicular manslaughter 
with gross negligence. 
At Ryan's trial, the jury heard very different stories about how the car accident 
came about. On the one hand, the State presented evidence that Ryan was chasing 
after his girlfriend (with whom he had supposedly just had an argument), and was 
driving approximately 110 mph when he crashed; on the other hand, both parties 
presented copious evidence (including Ryan's own testimony) that Ryan was the one 
being chased and, although still speeding, was driving at a much more reasonable 
speed of about 75 mph. In closing arguments, Ryan's counsel argued that her client's 
version of events was the most believable. In making this argument, she implored the 
jurors to re-review certain of the trial exhibits during its deliberations, and she drew 
particular attention to a video of the crash scene taken in the immediate aftermath of the 
crash, arguing that that video shows that Ryan was in no condition emotionally to 
concoct a series of lies about events leading up to the crash. However, after closing 
arguments concluded, the district court ruled that, while the bulk of the trial exhibits 
could go with the jury during its deliberations, the electronic audio and video exhibits 
could not. 
After deliberating for more than seven hours, the jury apparently rejected Ryan's 
version of events and found him guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. 
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Later, the district court imposed upon Ryan a unified sentence of ten years, with three 
yea rs fixed. 
Ryan now appeals. He contends that the district court erred in precluding the 
jurors from re-reviewing the electronic trial exhibits during its deliberations. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 24, 2009, while driving with his best friend in the seat next to him, 
19-year old Irwin "Ryan" Adams lost control of his car (a 1995 Saturn) and careened 
into a field, where the vehicle flipped. (See Exhibits, p.3.)1 Ryan suffered relatively 
minor injuries and was able to hobble out of the wrecked vehicle (see Tr., p.204, L.23 -
205, L.1, p.206, Ls.4-9), 2 but his best friend, Allen Larson, suffered massive injuries-a 
broken back, broken ribs, and a broken neck, which apparently led to "anoxic brain 
injury"-and died when his family had him removed from life support (see R., p.19). 
Approximately seven months later, on May 7, 2010, the county prosecutor chose 
to charge Ryan with vehicular manslaughter. (See R., pp.16-17.) Following a 
preliminary hearing (see R., pp.62-67), and an amendment of the original information, 
the State ultimately proceeded on the theory that Ryan had operated his "motor vehicle 
with gross negligence ... by driving his vehicle carelessly and heedlessly or without 
due caution and circumspection, and/or in a careless or imprudent manner, and/or by 
speeding, to wit: by driving a vehicle at a speed of 75 miles per hour or greater in a 50 
1 With regard to documentary exhibits, references are to the electronic file (.pdf format) 
"State v. Adams Exhibits," and citations are made to the pages of that electronic 
document. 
2 There are two separately-bound volumes of transcripts in the record in this case. 
Because the only volume cited to herein is that which contains the bulk of Ryan's trial 
and his sentencing hearing, it is cited simply as "Tr." 
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miles per hour speed zone, and/or trying to chase down another vehicle . . . " 
(R., pp.251-52.) 
Ryan exercised his Constitutional right to a jury trial. (See generally R., pp.305-
14, 315-35, 336-42.) 
At trial, the State presented accident reconstruction testimony tending to show 
that Ryan's Saturn was going at least 108 mph moments before his crash. (Tr., p.138, 
Ls.2-18.) The State also presented testimony from a number of individuals claiming to 
have heard Ryan say that he was going anywhere from 100 to 11 O mph before the 
crash, and that he was chasing after his girlfriend, Shayna Gonzales, at the time. 
(Tr., p.82, L.17 - p.91, L.3 (Brian Constable testifying that after picking up Shayna 
Gonzales and her mother, Teresa Stone-Broncheau, at Shayna's home, he was 
followed by Ryan), p.99, L.10 - p.116, L.2 (Ms. Stone-Broncheau testifying that after 
Mr. Constable picked her and Shayna up, they were all chased by Ryan), p.218, Ls.3-
10, 19-20 (Stephanie Nevarez, Allen's sister, testifying that Ryan told her he was 
driving, "trying to get some other people to put a baby in a car seat or something," and 
"that he was probably going around a hundred"), p.225, Ls.17-18 (Josh Kimbrough 
testifying that Ryan said "[h]e was going 110 and he was being-he was chasing 
Shayna and then they wrecked"), p.226, Ls.1-10 (same), p.234, L.11 (Brandy 
Kimbrough testifying that Ryan said "he was going about 11 O"), p.235, Ls. 7-18 (Brandy 
Kimbrough testifying that Ryan said he "was chasing Shayna because they broke up 
and she got mad and left"), p.243, Ls.9-14 (Larry Kimbrough testifying that "[h]e [Ryan] 
told me that he hit 110 chasing after Shayna" because they had had a fight and she 
left), p.249, Ls.3-6, 18-22 (Marissa Dempsey, Larry Kimbrough's girlfriend, testifying 
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that Ryan said he was going 110 mph, and that "he was chasing Shayna because they 
broke up and he was-he wanted to talk to her or something").)3 
However, the State also offered substantial evidence tending to show that Ryan 
was only going about 75 mph, and that he was the one who was being chased. 
(Tr., p.158, L.20 - p.159, L.22 (Cpl. Sean Walker testifying that when he came upon the 
crash scene and interviewed Ryan, who was extremely upset, Ryan stated that he was 
not going over 75 mph, and that he had been chased), p.167, L.3 - p.168, L.1 (same), 
p.173, L.1 - p.174, L.14 (Sgt. Keith Thompson testifying that when he interviewed Ryan 
at the crash scene, Ryan indicated that he been going approximately 75 mph, and that 
he had been chased), p.190, Ls.1-4 (Det. Kirk Thorpe testifying that when he 
interviewed Ryan at the crash scene, Ryan indicated that he had been chased), p.196, 
Ls.13-16 (Dep. Lawrence Green testifying that when he interviewed Ryan at the crash 
scene, Ryan indicated that he had been chased), p.198, Ls.1-7 (Dep. Green testifying 
that, moments later, he overheard Ryan talking to his father on the phone, stating that 
he was "doing about 80," and that he had been chased), p.198, Ls. 7-13 (Dep. Green 
testifying that when he questioned Ryan further, Ryan reiterated that he had been 
3 Later, Ryan offered significant evidence tending to show that the conversations 
testified to by Ms. Nevarez and the Kimbrough family never happened. (See, e.g., 
Tr., p.286, L.17 - p.289, L.5 (Kevin Adams, Ryan's father, testifying that he was with his 
son at the hospitals (for much of the time that Ryan was there) where Ryan supposedly 
confessed to Ms. Nevarez and various members of the Kimbrough family, and that 
Ryan was not out of his sight and did not speak to the Kimbroughs), p.321, L.8 - p.322, 
L.19 (Ryan testifying that he never spoke to Ms. Nevarez or the Kimbroughs about the 
crash), p.344, L.11 - p.349, L.13 (Shawna Lanting, Ryan's father's fiancee, offering 
testimony that was substantively identical to that of Ryan's father), p.367, L.20 (LaRey 
Adams, one of Ryan's sisters, testifying that she was with her brother at two of the three 
relevant hospitals, that Ryan virtually never left her side, and that she never saw Ryan 
speak to the Kimbroughs or talk to anyone about the crash), p.391, L.20 - p.397, L.2 
(Kendra Adams, one of Ryan's other sisters, offering testimony that was substantively 
identical to that of LaRey Adams).) 
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chased), p.106, Ls.12-13 (Kathie Allison, a good Samaritan who happened to be the 
first person at the scene of the crash, testifying that Ryan said he had been chased), 
p.218, Ls.4-15 (Stephanie Nevarez testifying that Ryan initially told her that "he was 
probably going like around 65 or 70" and that he was being chased), p.248, L.248, L.24 
- p.249, L.22 (Marissa Dempsey testifying that Ryan initially stated that he had been 
chased); Ex. 131 (audio recording of Sgt. Thompson's interview of Ryan at the hospital, 
wherein Ryan maintained that he had been chased); Ex. 134 (audio/video recording of 
crash scene, as captured by the dashboard-mounted camera in Det. Thorpe's vehicle, 
wherein Ryan apparently repeatedly indicated that he had been chased).)4 
In addition, when it was his turn to present evidence, Ryan offered the best 
evidence of what really happened in the minutes and seconds leading up to the crash 
that killed his best friend-his own recollection. He testified that he was followed, and at 
times tailgated, by a light-colored car which turned when he turned, stopped when he 
stopped (even when he pulled over to let the car pass), and accelerated when he 
accelerated; he further testified that he was going approximately 75 mph shortly before 
he crashed, and he denied ever having told anyone that he was driving 110-120 miles 
per hour. (Tr., p.299, L.22-p.306, L.10, p.312, L.16-p.313, L.11.) In fact, he denied 
ever having spoken to Ms. Nevarez or the Kimbroughs about the crash at all. 
(Tr., p.321, L.8 - p.322, L.19.) Ryan also offered the testimony of his father who, just 
4 The electronic exhibits in this case, Exriibits 123 (audio recording of 9-1-1 call), 131 
(audio recording police interview of Ryan), and 134 (audio and video recording of the 
crash scene), were retained by the district court. Contemporaneously herewith, Ryan is 
filing a motion to have those exhibits transported to the Supreme Court. Notably 
though, undersigned counsel has been informed by the district court that Exhibit 134, a 
DVD, has been damaged since Ryan's trial. It is unknown to undersigned counsel at 
this time whether that DVD will be viewable or whether his right to due process has 
been violated by the district court. 
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like all of the police officers who testified, had heard Ryan say that he had been chased. 
(Tr., p.336, Ls.7-13.) 
In its closing, the State sought to persuade the jurors that Ryan was driving well 
over 100 mph, and was chasing his girlfriend, thereby making it much easier for them to 
conclude that Ryan was guilty of the greater offense of vehicular manslaughter by gross 
negligence, as opposed to the lesser-included offense of vehicular manslaughter 
without gross negligence (see R., pp.376-77), or even no crime at all. (See Tr., p.443, 
L.10 - p.447, L.18.) In making this argument, the State urged the jury to disbelieve 
Ryan's testimony, particularly his contentions that he was the one who had been 
chased, and that he had only sped up to about 75 mph before the crash. (See 
Tr., p.435, L.4 - p.454, L.23.) The State even suggested that Ryan began weaving his 
web of lies mere moments after the crash, as his best friend, broken, unconscious, and 
dying, was still being extricated from the car and attended to by emergency medical 
personnel. (See, e.g., Tr., p.439, L.12 - p.441, L.16, p.447, L.19 - p.448, L.2.) Indeed, 
to disbelieve Ryan's trial testimony, one would have to conclude that he concocted an 
elaborate lie while he was still in his wrecked car or immediately thereafter, as Kathie 
Allison testified that Ryan told her that he had been chased. 5 (Tr., p.206, Ls.12-23.) 
However, during the defense's closing argument, defense counsel pointed out 
that Ryan was in no shape to concoct any sort of elaborate ruse in the immediate 
aftermath of the crash. (See Tr., p.457, L.22 - p.459, L.6, p.466, Ls.17-22) In fact, she 
implored the jurors to re-watch Exhibit 134, the video from the crash scene, and to see 
5 Ms. Allison was the first person to come upon the crash and, when she arrived, "[b]oth 
boys were still in the vehicle." (Tr., p.204, Ls.19-24.) 
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"Ryan Adams at his most raw," and decide whether "Ryan Adams is in any way [in] an 
emotional state where he can make up anything.''6 (Tr., p.457, L.19 - p.459, L.6.) 
Defense counsel also pointed out in her closing argument that that video exhibit 
(Exhibit 134) showed that, from the very first moment that the police arrived on-scene, 
they assumed Ryan had driven recklessly, and they steered their investigation toward 
that conclusion (for example, by failing to follow-up on evidence that might have 
supported other conclusions). (See Tr., p.457, Ls.14-19, p.458, Ls.1-5, p.459, L.7 -
p.461, L.1, p.463, L.16 - p.464, L.5, p.466, Ls.14-16.) Counsel further argued that 
Exhibits 134 (the video from the crash scene) and 131 (the audio recording of Ryan's 
interview at the hospital), when considered in conjunction with Ryan's trial testimony, 
show that Ryan's story has been remarkably consistent over time and, therefore, 
appears to be truthful. (See Tr., p.461, L.16- p.462, L.12, p.468, Ls.21-23, p.469, Ls.4-
11.) 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor also referred the jurors to the various electronic 
recordings that had been entered into evidence. (See Tr., p.471, Ls.9-17 (referring to 
Exhibit 134), p.471, L.18 - p.472, L.7 (referring to Ex. 123), p.476, L.4 - p.477, L.1 
(referring again to Exhibit 134).) Although she did not necessarily urge the jurors to re-
watch the video from the crash scene, she did argue at some length as to what she 
believed the jurors should listen for, and take away from, that recording if they chose to 
review it again. (Tr., p.476, L.4- p.477, L.1.) 
6 Besides Exhibit 134, which is the best evidence of Ryan's emotional state at the time, 
it is notable that Kathie Allison testified extensively about how obviously distraught Ryan 
was. (See, e.g., Tr., p.206, Ls.4-24, p.211, L.14 p.212, L.22.) Even some of the 
responding police officers acknowledged that Ryan was distraught. (See, e.g., 
Tr., p.158, L.25 - p.159, L.5 (testimony of Cpl. Walker), p.165, L.23 - p.166, L.6 (same), 
p.198, Ls.5-7, 14-16 (testimony of Dep. Green), p.200, Ls.2-20 (same).) 
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However, shortly after the prosecutor concluded the rebuttal portion of her 
closing argument the district court admonished the jurors that they could not, in fact, re-
watch or re-listen to the electronic exhibits during their deliberations: 
One thing I do want to clarify is that both counsel had said that you can 
listen to the audios, that is not the case. The audios are in evidence. You 
must remember what it was you heard, what you saw. Your deliberations 
must occur within the jury room and the jury room does not have the 
capability of playing those things. 
(Tr., p.479, Ls. 7-13.) Thereafter, the district court selected an alternate juror and 
dismissed the jurors to begin their deliberations. (See Tr., p.479, L.14 - p.12.) As soon 
as the jurors left the courtroom, defense counsel objected to the electronic exhibits not 
being made available to the jurors: 
MS. GOSNELL: You Honor, I do just have one issue. With regard 
to the video and the audio, those were admitted exhibits. I-
THE COURT: I understand that, but the jurors have to remember 
what they saw, what they heard. 
MS. GOSNELL: Well, but so they can't see the video, but they can 
get the pictures? 
THE COURT: Correct. Okay. 
MS. GOSNELL: Okay. I would just like to place that on the record 
as an objection to the fact that they can't see that. 
THE COURT: I understand. Okay. Anything else? 
(Tr., p.460, L.19 - p.481, L.6.) 
After deliberating for more than seven hours, the jury eventually returned with a 
guilty verdict on the greater offense of vehicular manslaughter by gross negligence. 
(Tr., p.485, L.12 - p.486, L.1.) Approximately two months later, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, a $5,000 fine, and a 
five-year driver's license suspension. (Tr., p.547, L.17 - p.548, L.1; R., pp.406-07.) It 
entered its judgment of conviction on May 9, 2011. (R., pp.404-09.) 
8 
On June 17, 2011, Ryan filed a notice of appeal which was timely from the 
district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.428-30.) On appeal, Ryan contends that 
the district court erred in precluding the jurors from re-reviewing the electronic trial 
exhibits during its deliberations. 
9 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in precluding the jurors from re-reviewing the electronic trial 
exhibits during its deliberations? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Precluding The Jurors From Re-Reviewing The Electronic 
Trial Exhibits During Its Deliberations 
Idaho law clearly provides that jurors have the right to have all of the trial exhibits 
available to them for further inspection or review during their deliberations. Specifically, 
it provides as follows: 
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them all exhibits 
and all papers (except depositions) which have been received in 
evidence in the cause, or copies of such public records or private 
documents given in evidence as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to 
be taken from the person having them in possession. They may also take 
with them the written instructions given and notes of the testimony or other 
proceedings on the trial, taken by themselves or any of them, but none 
taken by any other person. 
l.C. § 19-2203 (emphasis added). Accord State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 969 
(Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "[s]ince 1911, a jury in Idaho has by statute been allowed to 
take with it into its deliberation room all exhibits properly received in evidence in a 
cause," and holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing jurors to 
examine a bag containing three small bindles, and the defendant showed no prejudice 
attendant to the jurors' examination of the exhibit); State v. Healey, 45 Idaho 73, _, 260 
P. 694, 696 (1927) (finding no error in the trial court's decision to permit certain 
documentary exhibits "to be delivered to the jury during its deliberation"); State v. Foell, 
37 Idaho 722, _, 217 P. 608, 609 (1923) (finding no error in the trial court's decision to 
permit exhibits consisting of vessels of intoxicating liquids to be delivered to the jury 
during its deliberations, and distinguishing an earlier decision, State v. Crea, 10 Idaho 
88 (1904), which had limited the exhibits allowed to be sent to the jury room to 
documentary exhibits, as being based upon an earlier version of the statute which itself 
spoke only in terms of documentary exhibits). Cf. State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235 
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(1999) (observing that "[o]ne of the exhibits admitted into evidence at trial was the 
videotape of the statement given by Chad Toney, who had witnessed the murder of 
Jeffrey Towers," and that "[u]nder I.C. § 19-2203, the jury was entitled to take with it all 
exhibits into its deliberations," but declining to address the defendant-appellant's claim 
that it was error for the judge to require the jurors to review the video in the courtroom 
instead of the jury room because there was no contemporaneous objection to this 
procedure). 
Presumably, section 19-2203 evinces a Legislative preference for jurors to have 
free access to the trial evidence during its deliberations, so as to facilitate the most 
accurate fact-finding possible. Indeed, in State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 
1982), the Court of Appeals noted that, in the somewhat analogous situation in which 
the jurors requested the re-reading of trial testimony, "it is the right of the jury which is 
the primary concern of the statute," and 1t held that, under the facts of that case, "[t]he 
jury had a right to review this evidence."7 Id. at 207-08. Regardless of the intent behind 
7 Couch was concerned with the next provision of chapter 22 of title 19, which provides 
as follows: 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement 
between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct 
them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required 
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called. 
LC. § 19-2204. On the one hand, section 19-2203 seems to share a common purpose 
with section 19-2204, in that both provisions appear to be aimed at ensuring that jurors 
have the best information available while deliberating; on the other hand, the two 
provisions are somewhat different in that the former provision appears to be self-
executing, while the latter provision seems to require the jurors to come forward and 
affirmatively request the re-reading of certain testimony. This distinction, however, is of 
little consequence in this case, as the district court instructed the jurors that they could 
not re-review the electronic exhibits before they even had a chance to make such a 
request. (Tr., p.479, Ls.7-13.) 
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the statute though, the simple fact is that the district court erred in imposing a blanket 
prohibition against the jurors re-reviewing the electronic exhibits and admonishing them 
they had no choice but to rely on their memories of those exhibits. See I.C. § 19-2203. 
And this error was highly prejudicial. By failing to submit the audio and video 
exhibits to the jury for use in its deliberations, the district court de-emphasized the 
importance of those exhibits. See Couch, 103 Idaho at 208 ("It is, of course, essential 
that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner that there is a likelihood of 
it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury."). See also State v. Johnson, 138 
Idaho 103, 106 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A judge's remark will be deemed prejudicial if it 
constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or indicates an opinion of the court 
as to the defendant's guilt or innocence."); Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 
Idaho 643, 681 (1990) ("Repetition of instructions is improper if its effect is to give 
undue prominence or emphasis to a particular theory or view."). And in de-emphasizing 
the importance of Exhibit 134, the video from the crash scene, the district court tended 
to discount the evidence that was most critical to Ryan's defense. It also effectively 
kept that evidence from being fully considered by the jurors in their deliberations. 
This case, ultimately, came down to whether the jury believed that Ryan's 
testimony was truthful. Obviously, if Ryan was truthful in testifying that he was being 
chased and that he never exceeded a speed of about 75 mph, the jury would have been 
hard-pressed to find him guilty of vehicular manslaughter at all, much less the greater 
offense of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence; however, if the jury concluded 
that he was untruthful, and thus accepted the State's contention that Ryan was the one 
doing the chasing and that, in the process, he was driving at a speed in excess of 100 
or 110 mph, a finding of guilt as to vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence was all 
13 
but a foregone conclusion. As noted, in her closing argument, defense counsel argued 
extensively about the electronic exhibits, but focused particularly on Exhibit 134 in 
arguing that Ryan's testimony was truthful: 
And to start with the video that you heard that the state presented to you 
presented that Officer Thorp [sic] said was the video from his dash cam, 
and I ask you, because you're going to have all this evidence in the room, 
I ask you to go back and listen to that video in that jury room, because that 
video has Ryan Adams at his most raw .... 
You hear Ryan moments after a horrific accident in which he is 
injured and his best friend Allen Larsen is severely injured. You hear 
Ryan unable to tell o'fficers his date of birth, who he was, who his best 
friend was, hysterical. You can hear it in his voice. The officers said he 
was not calm. 
But you also hear him say one thing consistently, "I was being 
chased. I don't remember anything, but I was being chased." He says 
that throughout that video. 
Now, the state would have you believe that this is some sort of 
a concocted story. And I ask you to listen to that video and tell me if 
the voice you hear from Ryan Adams is in any way an emotional 
state where he can make up anything. You have witnesses talking 
about his emotional state, about his desire to get back to that vehicle to 
his friend, and yet he was somehow in an emotion[al] state where he 
could just make this up[?] 
He didn't remember his own date of birth, he didn't know where his 
driver's license was, but he could just make this up[?] I ask you to judge 
for yourself when you listen to that video and from when you've 
heard it already if you think that that's actually possible. 
(Tr., p.457, L.19 - p.459, L.6.) By precluding the jurors from fully considering Ex. 134 
and the other electronic exhibits during their deliberations, the district court completely 
undermined Ryan's defense; it prevented the jurors from going back and studiously 
considering the most critical piece of evidence in determining whether to believe Ryan's 
testimony and, thus, whether to find Ryan guilty. 
Furthermore, because defense counsel had every right to expect that the district 
court would comply with Idaho law and allow all of the trial exhibits to go with the jurors 
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during their deliberations, the timing of the district court's error in precluding the 
electronic exhibits to be re-reviewed by the jurors exacerbated the prejudice attendant 
to that error. Had the district court made its ruling prior to, or during, Ryan's trial, 
defense counsel could have taken steps to ameliorate the harm attendant to the district 
court's error. For example, instead of asking the jurors to go back and re-review Ex. 
134 during its deliberation, counsel could have played select portions of that video for 
the jurors during her closing argument. However, all ability to mitigate the damage of its 
erroneous ruling was taken away by the district court waiting until the very last second 
to make that ruling. 
For these reasons, the district court's error was extremely prejudicial. See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010) ("In order to avoid confusion and promote 
equal application of the law, Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman 
harmless error test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to, 
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such an error 
occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). 8 
8 Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), the government must 
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. Under this standard, "[t]he inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred 
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). "That must be so, because to 
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable 
the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee." Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ryan Adams respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his conviction for voluntary manslaughter (with gross negligence) and remand 
his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 23 rd day of July, 2012. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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